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LIABILITY OF A SURGEON WHO PERFORMS AN OPERATION UNDER
ANAESTHESIA UPON A PATIENT, WITHOUT THE EXPRESS
CONSENT OF THE PATIENT.
In a recent case before the Supreme Court of New Jersey, it
appeared that the plaintiff applied to the defendant to perform
a surgical operation upon a rupture on his left groin. After the
patient had been etherized, a rupture on the right side of a more
serious character was discovered, which was likely to cause the
plaintiff's death. The defendant operated 6n the more serious
rupture, and was sued by the patient for assault and battery. The
trial Court followed the opinion in Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.,
361, to the effect that the patient must be the final arbiter to decide
whether or not he will take the chances of the operation, and that
therefore the consent of the patient, express or implied, must be
given before the operation could be lawful, and rendered a sub-
stantial judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant ap-
pealed. The higher Court awarded judgment for the defendant,
holding that when a person, who is in a serious condition, has
selected a surgeon to represent him during an operation under
anoesthesia, the law by implication casts upon him the duty of
acting for the best interest of the patient. This implication,
however, confers no right upon him to perform an operation of a
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different sort from' that to which the patient has consented, or
which involves risks and results of a kind not contemplated. Ber-
man v. Personnet, 83 Atl. (N. J.), 948.
The scope of a surgeon's authority in operating upon a patient
depends a great deal upon circumstances. The relation may arise
from contract express or implied, or by an implied license. If
not laboring under such disability as to make an intelligent consent
impossible, it is for the patient to decide whether or not the opera-
tion should be performed, and his consent is a prerequisite to the
surgical operation. In the absence of fraud or misrepresenta-
tion, when the patient voluntarily submits to a given operation
his consent will be presumed. In the case of Mohr v. Williams,
95 Minn., 361, it appeared that the defendant made a specialty
of the disorders of the ear, and at the request of the plaintiff,
examined her ears, and advised an operation on the right ear.
After the patient had been placed under the influence of anes-
thesia the defendant made an examination of the left ear, and
found it in a more serious condition that the right ear. The
defendant performed a successful operation on the left ear, but
the plaintiff complained that her hearing was impaired by the
operation, and that as it was done without her consent it was
unlawful and constituted an assault and battery. The trial Court
awarded her a verdict, and the defendant appealed. The Superior
Court sustained the Court below, holding that there had been no
authority given to perform the operation, and the patient should
have been informed as to the operation, before the surgeon was
justified in performing it. In this case it should be noted that
the plaintiff's condition was not serious. In such a case the
patient should be allowed to regain consciousness and be given
an opportunity to consent to the operation.
In the case of Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill., 300, the plaintiff had been
suffering from epilepsy and consulted the defendant, a sur-
geon. He found that a major and a minor operation were neces-
sary, but informed the patient of the necessity of only the minor
one, to which she consented. It was performed and she left the
hospital. Later she returned to have the same operation re-
peated. The surgeon noted her nervous condition, which he
described as insanity, and knowing that she would not consent if
asked, when she was under anesthesia for the minor operation
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he also performed the more serious one. He acted in good faith
and used proper skill. The Court found that the patient was
sane enough to be able to consent, and held the surgeon liable in
exemplary damages.
The consent of the patient may be express or implied, from
the circumstances of the case. Usually the question of implied
-consent is a question of fact for the jury, but in some cases the
Court has held as a matter of law that the consent to the per-
formance of a particular operation should be implied from the
fact that the patient placed himself 'under the surgeon's care.
-When the patient leaves it to the discretion of the surgeon to pro-
-ceed upon his best judgment, and, when the nature and extent of
the operation cannot be fully determined by a preliminary exam-
ination, it is undoubtedly within the scope of his authority to
-exercise his discretion. In such a case,. if during the operation,
the patient being under anesthesia, unusual and unexpected con-
ditions are found that, in the judgment of the surgeon, call for
a more extended or a different operation than the one contem-
plated, he may operate if in his judgment a failure to do so would
imperil the life of the patient. The case of McClallen v. Adams,
19 Pick., 333, falls within this class of cases. In this case the
-defendant's wife, who was dangerously ill, was placed under a
surgeon's care, and after the lapse of some weeks, the plaintiff
performed an operation for the cure of the disease. Soon after-
ward she died. It was held, in an action for his services, that the
performance of the operation was within the scope of the plain-
tiff's authority if, in his judgment, under the circumstances it was
necessary and expedient. In all such cases the surgeon should
'have an understanding with his patient in advance to prevent a
possible misunderstanding. The surgeon can protect himself
from liability by obtaining authority from the person who is
-naturally, or legally, the parent or guardian. Consent of the hus-
band under such circumstances to an operation on the wife, or by
a parent to an operation upon a minor child, would protect him
from liability.
In Wigmore's Summary of the Principles of Torts, Volume 2,
page 88o, he says: "A defendant is excused for harm done to the
plaintiff when the plaintiff beforehand consented to the doing of
-that specific harm or class of harm", and: "Where the plaintiff's
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consent is not expressly or impliedly given, and cannot be ob-
tained, but it may reasonably be supposed from the circumstances
that it would have been given if he could have been asked, the de-
fendant is equally excused; namely, (a) Where his property or
family is in danger of serious immediate harm and he is absent
and there is no time to notify him; or, (b) Where his person if,
in danger of serious immediate harm and he is unconscious of it
and there is no time to notify him."
The principal case seems to fall within the last class of cases,
and can be justified on the ground of practical necessity rather
than on that of contract express or implied. It would not be
sound public policy to tie the hands of the surgeon, when in the
exercise of his skill he could save the life of the patient. This
rule is not a liberal one in its application, and should be applied
only to cases in which the. patient is in serious immediate danger
of loss of life or limb, and where from the circumstances of the
case it would be impracticable to obtain his consent.
LIABILITY OF A WAREHOUSEMAN TO AN ASSIGNEE OF A NON-NEGO-
TIABLE WAREHOUSE RECEIPT.
The decisions of the Courts are not uniform as to the effect of
an assignment of a non-negotiable warehouse receipt, where the
assignee gives no notice of the assignment to the warehouseman.
In a recent decision, Stephenville Compress Co. v. First Nat
Bank, 148 S. W. (Texas), 335, it was decided that, although ware-
house receipts recite that the property which they represent will
be delivered only upon the return of the receipts, a bank loaning
money on the strength of such security is not warranted in relying
upon the statement.
The principal case was an action brought by the assignee of a.
non-negotiable warehouse receipt against a warehouseman for
delivering to the pledgor the property represented by the ware-
house receipt. The receipt stipulated that the property would be-
delivered only upon the return of the receipt.
The ground of the decision in this case was that the receipts
were non-negotiable, and the assignee had failed to give the ware-
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houseman notice of the fact that he held the receipts as collateral
or that he had any interest in the receipts.
A warehouse receipt is a contract of bailment between the
owner of the goods and the warehouseman, serving as a document
of title, and being either negotiable or non-negotiable, according
to the obligations assumed by the warehouseman, or according to
statutory provisions.
A warehouse receipt, in the absence of statute, is not a nego-
tiable instrument in the commercial sense. If one takes under
such circumstances by a transfer of the receipt he is in the same
position as if he purchased the property itself. He acquires no
better title than the pledgor had. DeWolf v. Gardner, 15 Barb.
(N. Y.), 508.
The transfer of a warehouse receipt in good faith and in thd
ordinary course of business operates to transfer to the holder the
title to the goods covered by the receipt. Davis v. Russell, 52
Cal., 6i.
The Courts which follow the doctrine of the principal case hold
that when the receipt is non-negotiable, the obligation of the ware-
houseman is toward the person designated as pledgor and no one
else. It is said that although the assignment of the receipt vested
title to the goods in the assignee, it did not transfer the contract;
that the warehouseman could not be made bailee to the assignee
without notice of the assignment of the contract.
"The receipt merely stands in place of the property it repre-
sents, and the delivery of it has the same effect in transferring the
title to the property as the transfer of the property itself. The
delivery of the receipt does not transfer the contract itself, so as
to enable the assignee or indorsee to maintain an action upon it
in his own name. There is no privity of contract between the
warehouseman and the assignee. The assignee occupies no bet-
ter position as regards the warehouseman than his assignor did."
Jones on Pledges, Sec. 281.
The transfer of a non-negotiable warehouse receipt does not
constitute the warehouseman the bailee for a stranger. He re-
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mains the bailee of the party who intrusted him with the goods.
The bailor is not bound to produce the receipt as a condition pre-
cedent to his right to get back the goods on payment of charges,
and the bailee can safely deliver the goods without it. Hallgarten
v. O'ldham, 135 Mass., i.
When a warehouse receipt runs to the bailor personally, and
is not negotiable in form, the bailor may not effect a transfer of
the title by mere delivery of the receipt without the consent of
the warehouseman. Gill v. Frank, 12 Ore., 507. The same Court
states: "The custodian cannot become the servant of another in
respect of his custody except by his own agreement."
There are many jurisdictions which hold contra to the decision
of the principal case.
The Court in Gibson v. Stevens, 8 Howard (N. Y.), 384, held
that the transfer by indorsement and delivery of the receipt trans-
fers the legal title to the property and the constructive possession,
and the warehouseman becomes the bailee of the transferee from
the time of transfer without notice to or attornment by him.
It has been held by the Federal Court that there is no duty on
the assignee of a warehouse receipt to notify the warehouseman
of the pledge. First Nat. Bank v.. Bates, i Fed., 702.
The warehousemen by issuing receipts have represented that
they had property in the warehouse, and would there keep it until
the certificate was returned. The warehousemen and not inno-
cent persons who had relied on their representation must bear the
loss. Quick v. Milligen, io8 Ind., 419.
The Courts which repudiate the doctrine in the principal case
have stated that the receipts are as symbols of the goods, author-
izing the possessor of such document to transfer the goods thereby
represented. Durr v.'Hervev. 44 Ark., 301. It is not assilmed
thaft the receipts are negotiable in the strict legal sense, but that
they may be spoken of in the same sense as a key, in that the de-
livery of the key of the warehouse is a symbol of the property
therein stored. They operate to pass possession and title to the
_property as effectively as if it were manually delivered.
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It is stated in Benjalnin on Sales, p. 846: "A warehouseman in
,ossess9;fn of goods is the bailee of the owner alqne from whom
he received them, and cannot be forced to becpme the bailee of
anyone else without his consent. But there is nothing in the law
to prevent this assent from being given in advance." It has
been held that this assent was implied by issuing the warehouse
receipt, stipulating that the property would be delivered only on
presentation of the receipt. City Banking Co. v. Peacock, lO3 Ga.,
171.
Colebrook on Collateral Securitics, Secs. 413-414, says: "The
transfer for value as collateral security of warehouse receipts by
indorsement and delivery or by delivery only where such receipts
are made payable to 'holder' or 'only upon the return of this re-
ceipt,' vests the legal title and possession pf the property in the
pledgee and is equivalent to an actual delivery of the prqperty.
"The pledgee of warehouse receipts receiving the same with or
-without 'indorsement as collateral upon a bona fide loan or dis-
count of commercial paper stands in the same privileged position
as a bona fide purchaser for value of like receipts." He also
states that the pledgor of warehouse receipts is under no obliga-
tion to notify the warehouseman of the transfer to him of such
receipt as collateral security.
In the case of Stewart v. Insurance Co., 9 Lea (Tenn.), 104,
the Court places the ground of its decision on estoppel. "Where
a warehouseman issues a receipt stipulating that the goods will be
delivered only on return of such, he cannot be heard to say that
be hao1 nq notice of the transfer of the receipt, but is estppped to
deny that jie held the property subject to a return of the receipt."
The preponderance of authority is that in the absence of statu-
tory regulations the assignee of a non-negotiable warehouse re-
teipt can recover against the issuing warehouseman for conver-
sion of the stored goods in the absence of notice to the warehouse-
man of the assignment, which is contra to the doctrine of the
principal case.
Judge Ramsey, in the case of Stamford Co. %,. Bank, 144 S. W.
(Tex.), 1130, stated: "To require notice would in the nature of
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things beget confusion, invite litigation and so discourage and
interfere with the orderly conduct of business as to be substan-
tially impracticable."
Many States have now adopted the report of the Commission
on Uniform State Laws, which has done much to standardize the
warehouse receipts as well as minimize the possibilities of abuse
through fraud to which these instruments have been frequently
subjected.
Under the Sales Act, Sec. 34, the assignees would not be pro-
tected. Under that Act, when there is a transfer of a non-
negotiable document of title, the document does not control the
possession of the goods, and is therefore not a symbol of them.
CAN A MARRIED WOMAN IAINTAIN AN ACTION OF TORT AGAINST
HER HUSBAND FOR A TORT COMMITTED DURING CONERTURE?
In Thompson v. Thompson, 2IS U. S., 6ii, the plaintiff sued
her husband for $7o,ooo damages for seven distinct assaults made
on her while pregnant. The husband demurred to it, relying on
the coverture at the time as a defense. The action was brought
under Sec. 1i55 of the Code of the District of Columbia, which
provided that "married women shall have power to sue separately
for the recovery, security or protection of their property and for
torts committed against them as fully and freely as if they were
unmarried." The majority of the Supreme Court held she could
not maintain this action even under this statute. They argued
that at common law neither spouse was liable for torts against the
other. Admitting that statutes are quite general now, allowing
her to protect her person against assaults by third persons, "the
statute was not intended to give a right of action as against the
husband, but to allow the wife in her own name to maintain
actions of tort which at common law must be brought in the joint
names of herself and husband." They justify thus limiting the
statute by observing that "such radical and far-reaching changes
should only be wrought by language so clear and plain as to be
unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention." She has
other remedies. (I) a criminal action against her husband; (2)
suit for divorce and separation; and (3) chancery will protect her
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separate property rights. But three justices-and their views
are surely entitled to great weight-Justices Harlan, Holmes and
Hughes, held there was that necessary "clear and plain" language
here to show the legislature meant to bring about this "radical
and far-reaching change." Justice Harlan says, "there is 1o
room whatever for mere construction, so explicit the words of
Congress." Besides there is no discrimination made as to par-
ties committing the tort in the statute, It is admitted by the
majority she could sue her husband separately in tort for recovery
of her property and damages for its detention; and there are no
grounds for going further and discriminating as to tle kinds of
tort for which she could or could not maintain an action, as the
majority do. Whether this is expedient and good public policy or
not is a question for the legislature, and courts are not justified
in construing an act contrary to the plainly expresned intention of
the legislature on any grounds of expediency or public policy.
Of course, at common law she would have no right of action in
such a case. I Cooley on Torts, 3rd edition, 47o; Hobbs v.
Hobbs, 70 Ale., 383; Jenne v. Marble, 37 Mich., 319; White v.
Wager, 25 N. Y., 328. The old common law rule was as was said in
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 A,'e., 306, 307: "By earliest edicts of Courts,
he had a right to strike her as punishment for her misconduct,
and her only remedy was that 'she hath retaliation to beat him
again if she dare.'" But this view is not in accord with Ameri-
can ideas, and the Supreme Court in Carroll v, Rgidy, 5 App-
D. C., 59, 62, said: "There never was any good reason for carry-
ing the feudal notion of the unity of husband and wife, which
was not the Christian notion, to the absurd extreme to which it
has sometimes been pushed." So statutes of about the same gen-
eral effect have been passed throughout the United States, and the
question of the principal case here is entirely as to the construc-
tion to be placed on these by the Courts.
It must be admitted that the decision of the principal case reprg=
sents the steady trend of American authority; in fact no case
squarely opposed to it decided by the highest Court of any State
has been found, but there have been some expressions of disap-
proval even when applying it, and under a statute as broad as the
one in the principal case it seems to be a pure judicial limitation
on the intent of the legislature. Judge Cooley, in i Cooley on
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Torts, 3rd edition, p. 474, says as the American rule, that the
wife cannot sustain an action for a personal tort committed to her
person or reputation by her husband during coverture.
As to property rights, it is generally held she can sue her hus-
band freely under these statutes. The Supreme Court of the
United States supported a note given by a husband to his wife as
security for a loan by her to him, after it had been assigned.
Bronsouv. Brady, 28 App. D.C.,25o. Direct recovery by the wife on
a similar note was allowed in Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn.,
23, and in May v. May, 9 Nebr., 16, and in In re Deaner's Estate,
26 Iowa, 701. Maine and Pennsylvania, however, have not
allowed the wife to recover in assumpsit for a loan of her separate
property to her husband. Small v. Small, 129 Pa. St., 366; Ken-
nedy v. Knight, 174 Pa. St., 408; Crowther v. Crowther, 55 Me.,
358. These last States are excessively strict, and generally as to
her sole and separate property she can sue and be sued as a feme
sole. Chestnut v. Che.stnut, 77 Il., 346; Heintz- v. Heintz, 12o
S. '"". (Tex.), 941; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich., Ioo; I
Cooley on Torts, 3rd edition, p. 474.
The majority of States have allowed this action as to her prop-
erty to be maintained, even though it took the form of a tort
action. It is admitted, in the principal case, that it would be
allowed by the Supreme Court under the statute they were con-
struing. In White v. White, 58 Mich., 546, replevin was allowed,
the Court saying: "We have no doubts as to her right to maintain
this action." In Berdell v. Parkhurst & Berdell, 19 Hun, 358,
the husband was allowed to recover for the wrongful conversion
by his wife of his property, the Court saying they held in Whitney
v. WhitneY, 3 Abbot's Prac. (N. S.), 350, 49 Barb., 3f9, that a
wife could maintain an action under the same circumstances.
Trover was allowed by the wife against the husband for some
property he had taken away contrary to a separation agreement
in Carpenter v. Carpenter, 154 Mich., ioO. Recovery by her for
conversion of her sole and separate estate was allowed in Heintz
v, Heintz, 12o S. W. (Tex.), 941, and also in Emerson v. Clayton,
32 Ill., 493. But Maine does not allow either trover, Smith v.
Gorman, 41 Me., 405, or replevin, Hobbs v. Hobbs, 70 Me., 383,
although Maine has a seemingly broad statute: "She may com-
mence, prosecute and defend any suit in law or equity to final
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judgment in her own name in the same manner as if she were
unmarried, or she may prosecute or defend such suit jointly with
her husband." The Court reasons that this alternative excludes
the construction of an action against her husband.
But as to tort actions for torts to the person or reputation of
the wife, the Courts have uniformly read into the statutes a dis-
tinction and not allowed them. The leading case showing this
is Freethy v. Freethy, 42 Barb., 641. This was an action by the
wife to recover for slander by her husband; and the Court ad-
mitted the words were clearly actionable. The statute said, "any
married woman may bring and maintain an action in her own
name for damages against any person, or body corporate, for any
injury to her person or character, the same as if she were sole."
The Court said the words were broad enough to include the hus-
band, "but were not within the intent of the statute." They hold
that when "the legislature intends to make such a striking innova-
tion of the rules of the common law and so much opposed to public
pplicy and the peace and happiness of the conjugal relation, it
should use such language as will make it clearly manifest." It
seems as though they did here. The New York Court under
the same statute and on the same reasoning held in Longendyke v.
Longendyke, 44 Barb., 366, that an action for assault and battery
could not be maintained by the wife against her husband. Here
again they admitted it was "covered by the literal language of this
section, but I think such was not the meaning and intent of the
legislature." It would "break up that conjugal union and tran-
quility which it has always been the policy of the law to guard
and protect." But it seems as though this "tranquility" had
already been broken by the assaults, and this action was no more
against public policy than an action against him in the criminal
courts. The same question came before the Court of Appeals
of New York in Schultz! v. Schltz, 89 N. Y., 644, and the action
was dismissed. The majority gave no opinion, but there were
two strong dissents, and the Supreme Court, 27 Hun, 26, 63 How.
Prac., 181, had allowed the action, in a long strong opinion.
Under authority of Schultz v. Schultz, supra, an action for assault
and battery was dismissed in Abbe v. Abbe, 48 N. Y. Supp., 25, in
1897, although a statute has been passed since *then, giving her
"a right of action for an injury to her person," and "for an injury
arising out of the marital relation." Thus it seems settled at
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last in New York that such an action as in the principal case is
not maintainable although admittedly within the words of the
statute.
Minnesota would not allow an action for a personal tort, but
its statute is not as liberal as in the principal case. The
statute said the wife should have the same right to sue in any form
of action "that her husband has to appear in his name alone,"
and as he could not sue her for a tort she could not sue him.
Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn., 427. In California, in an action by a
husband against his wife for wilfully shooting him in the leg
with a shotgun, it was held that its statute as to one spouse
suing another "related solely to contract and property rights."
They say in this opinion that "there is no case in favor of the
right to maintain such an action." Peters v. Peters, 103 Pac., 218.
Michigan, in Bandfield v. Bandfield, ii7 Mich., 8o, and Iowa, in
Peters v. Peters, 42 Iowa, 182, both denied the right to maintain
an action for assault and battery, but their statutes only applied
in express terms "to actions in relation to her sole property,"
(Michigan) and "as owner of property may maintain action"
(Iowa). Louisiana has a strict statute, only allowing suits be-
tween them for separation, or as to her sole and separate prop-
erty. Mary Heyob v. Her Husband, 18 La. Ann., 41 ; Moore v.
Moore, 18 La. Ann., 613. Illinois, in Main v..Main, 46 Ill. App.,
io6, does not allow an action by a wife after divorce for false
imprisonment in an asylum during coverture, holding the statu-
tory changes applied only to property, and that they would not
abrogate old common law rules unless forced to do so by direct
terms of the statute or by necessary implication.
Maine, under her policy of strict construction of these statutes,
naturally will not allow an action for personal tort against the wife
during coverture, either before divorce, for assault, Libby v.
Berry, 74 Me., 286, or after divorce, for false imprisonment,
Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me., 304. They construe the liberal stat-
-ute as meaning she could only now maintain "in her own name,
those (actions) which before must have been brought in the hus-
band's name, either alone, or as party plaintiff with her."
In Sykes v. Speer, 112 S. W. (Tex.), 422, the Court said, "that
a wife cannot sue her husband for torts committed against her
person or her reputation while that relationship existed is not an
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open question in this State"; they "were compelled to follow" the
-old case of Nickerson v. Nickerson, 65 Tex., 281, where such all
-action was not allowed, but in that case there was no question of
a statute discussed. The Court says in the opinion: "It would
seem to the writer that if a husband can be held responsible crim-
inally for an unjustifiable assault upon one whom the law has
placed under his care and protection, certainly the same consid-
•eration of policy would permit her to recover compensation for
damages, when sought in a proceeding after the dissolution of the
marriage relation."
While unquestionably the majority of the Court in the prin-
-cipal case have decided in the same way as almost all the State
Courts, when the same question has been presented-maintained
the common law in the teeth of the words of the statute, because
they consider it better public policy, it seems as though the minor-
ity argument, that it is the province of the legislature to determine
the question, is the sounder. Is it enough against public policy
and the modqrn conception of the marital relation to justify the
,Court in contravening the plain words of the statute? If we have
abandoned "the old feudal notion of unity of husband and wife"
to the extent of allowing a criminal action against the husband for
assaults on his wife, why not to the extent of allowing her to re-
,cover damages for it also, when the statute in terms allows it?
